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FEDERALISM OR FEDERATIONISM 
William E. Butler* 
FEDERALISM, DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE RULE OF LAW IN 
RUSSIA. By Jeffrey Kahn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002. 
Pp. xii, 319. $65. 
When I took up my appointment in October 1970 as Reader in 
Comparative Law in the University of London, I was invited to col­
laborate in teaching the LL.M.' course in Soviet Law offered within the 
University on an intercollegiate basis. The course had been introduced 
two years previously, the first of its kind within the realm. Originally it 
was offered by a team of three, regrettably all now deceased: Edward 
Johnson, Ivo Lapenna, and Albert K. R Kiralfy. I had come to 
England to replace the late Edward Johnson, whose untimely death 
had left vacant the Readership in Soviet Law, tenable at University 
College London. He had, I believe, been instrumental in introducing 
the Soviet Law course, having in 1967 launched a series of evening lec­
tures on the subject which were open to the public, were well at­
tended, and resulted in the book that appeared posthumously.1 
With my arrival, Albert Kiralfy decided to step out of the course 
and leave it to be taught by Lapenna and myself, which we duly did for 
the next seventeen years. It soon became clear that we shared a fun­
damentally different perception of the nature of the structure of both 
the USSR and, within that entity, the Russian Soviet Federated 
Socialist Republic ("RSFSR"). Having discovered the differences, we 
developed a "horse and pony" show over the years to introduce stu­
dents to what we considered the core issues to be. And great fun it 
was. 
I was away on sabbatical during the 1986-87 academic year, so I 
never learned Lapenna's latest views on perestroika and its implica-
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1444 
May 2002] Federalism or Federationism 1445 
tions for constitutional law. When we last had the opportunity to per­
form together in autumn 1985, no changes were in evidence. The es­
sence of Lapenna's perception therefore will not, I think, have 
changed. In his view the Soviet Union as a whole, and the RSFSR as a 
constituent union republic of the USSR, were thoroughly "federal­
ized." In substance the USSR was a unitary state clothed in "federal" 
dress. The trappings of statehood for the fifteen union republics, and a 
fortiori for lesser administrative-territorial entities, were nothing more 
than a symbolic genuflection in the direction of structures that served, 
and should serve, ideological purposes against the particular back­
ground of Russian history. The Soviet Union in this respect was a tri­
umph of substance over form, and that was all that truly mattered. 
Without necessarily quarreling with the perception of substance, 
which I pointed out did vary over the course of time, I emphasized the 
importance of form. The Treaty of the Union of 30 December 1922 -
which formed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - was a docu­
ment of international law concluded, initially, by four independent 
states. Labels are not easy.here, but to me, on the spectrum of "con­
federation - federation - federal," it was closer to the confederation 
but supple enough to incorporate strong dosages of federation and 
federal models. Lawyers tend to focus upon the formal mechanisms of 
federalism: rights of secession, applicable law, remedies, attributes of 
statehood, and so on. Lapenna dismissed the treaty and constitutional 
rights of secession by the union republics as "paper" rights, unrealiz­
able in practice . without civil war. To me they were "sleeping dog" 
provisions, unrealizable at the time, but who could say what their fu­
ture role might be. 
Looking back over the past decade, "form" proved to have been of 
exceptional, if not decisive, importance in shaping the dismantling of 
the Soviet Union, and form continues to be a central concern in re­
shaping the structure of the Rµssian Federation. Those who viewed 
the Soviet Union as irretrievably unitary or federal in substance will 
quite naturally have expected any disintegration of that structure in all 
likelihood to have been accompanied qy widespread violence and civil 
strife. That disintegration should have proceeded in accordance with 
the international law of treaties some find as implausible as the peace­
ful turning over of Hong Kong back to China once the lease and treaty 
schemes had lapsed there. 
Be that as it may, "federationism" - to use the term I preferred in 
my own study of Russian law2 - in the Russian Federation has taken 
new directions to address old problems. Dr. Jeffrey Kahn's3 admirable 
and . thoroughly researched study offers invaluable materials and in-
2. See W. E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAW 274 (1999). 
3. Jeffrey Kahn is a graduate of St. Anthony's College, Oxford University (D.Phil.) and 
the University of Michigan Law School. 
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sights on what has been transpiring in the world of Russian federalism 
(and beyond) from the earliest Soviet days to the present, with par­
ticular emphasis and depth on the post-Soviet decade. 
Kahn's study is a revised version of a D.Phil. thesis completed at 
Oxford University, and to a certain extent, but not disruptively, it be­
trays its dissertation origins. As for the Butler/Lapenna dialogue, he 
would have been strongly pro-Lapenna, although he creates as his 
nemesis Professor William H. Riker,4 whose classic study of federalism 
serves as the foil for many of Kahn's observations and conclusions. 
Kahn makes his position absolutely clear from the outset: 
It has frequently been asserted, first, that federal government is possible 
in a non-democratic regime, and second, that this holds true even when 
fundamental legal principles are absent. The Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics is cited as the classic example of such a state structure. I dis­
pute the validity of these theoretical and empirical assertions . . .  the So­
viet Union was a federal facade that hardly masked the most centralized 
state in modern history. (p. 1) 
He rightly observes that this "facade" had "tremendous repercus­
sions" for the development of post-Soviet Russian federalism, itself a 
multinational species of federationism built upon the "crumbling 
foundations" of the former Soviet Union. And he rightly observes 
with some wonderment that "a new state was built almost overnight in 
both the real and ideological rubble of the ancien regime" (p. 1). 
In my view, of course, there should be no wonderment, for such is 
the beauty of "legal form," moribund or not, that the disappearance of 
one level of state structure founded formally upon international legal 
concepts leaves a residual vessel into which the new federationism 
pours relatively readily. This is not to suggest that the Russian 
Federation is nothing more than a USSR at a new level; it most em­
phatically is not, and Kahn's study is the best known to me that over­
whelmingly and scrupulously makes that plain. 
But I find Kahn's assault upon Riker5 unpersuasive because, for 
different reasons, I find Riker, as expounded by Kahn, unconvincing. 
The difficulty seems to me to lie with American political science gen­
erally: its "Americanization" of the concept of what is federal and 
what is not, and its "romanticism" about the putative relationship 
among "federalism," democracy, and the rule of law. Terminology 
may be partly, or mostly, at the root of the issue. 
American terminology concentrates upon the word "federal" and 
"federalism." Kahn says that. "federalism is a broad church, and 'fed-
4. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE (1964). 
5. "In a departure from the classic exposition of federal theory by William Riker, I dis­
pute the assertion that federalism is possible in an authoritarian environment. The immedi­
ate implication of this approach is the rejection of the surprisingly unchallenged view of the 
Soviet Union as an authoritarian, yet nevertheless federal, system of government." P. 2. 
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eral' can describe a wide continuum of institutional arrangements" 
(p. 2). But that is just the point. "Federal" is not in reality a broad 
church; it is a narrow church at one end of the "federationist" contin­
uum or spectrum. I used the word "federationism" in my study of 
Russian law precisely because in my view the expression "federal" 
would have been inappropriate and misleading. I would here go fur­
ther to suggest that we need to apply and, if necessary, invent a range 
of terminology to cope more accurately with the finer distinctions of 
the federative syndrome . .  
Working just with the Russian language for the moment (others 
must be brought into the equation), it is simply wrong in my view to 
translate "federativnyi" and "federal'nyi" as synonyms (which Kahn 
does not necessarily do, although the substance of his argument con­
flates the concepts). But that is only the beginning. There is "federal­
izm" (federalism), "federalizatsiia" (federalization), "defederalizat­
siia" (defederalization), "federirovanie" (whose translation needs 
thoughtful consideration) and "federationism" - all of which have 
subspecies, such as, state federalism, financial federalism, budgetary 
federalism, and so on.6 Is the United States of America a "federal" 
system? Absolutely. Is it a federation, or a federated system? Not 
really - at least not since the Civil War. Is the Russian Federation a 
"federal" system? No, but it is a "federative" or "federated" system, 
and it has a "federal" government. 
Insofar as federalism is by definition linked with the "requirements 
of democracy and the rule of law," depending upon how these are de­
fined, we move away from considerations of structure and balances of 
power to more subjective characterizations. Federationism is certainly 
possible in an authoritarian environment, and both the former Soviet 
Union and the present Russian Federation are examples, given that 
authoritarianism also operates on a spectrum of degree. All states are 
authoritarian to some extent in some of their public's eyes. But surely 
to pursue the proposition; one must be able to distinguish terminologi­
cally among the species or types of federative schemes which exist and 
which existed in the past. 
As for the requirements of democracy and the rule of law vis-a-vis 
federalism, l am not confident as to precisely what these are. Kahn is 
content to define them by using concepts of political science. Democ­
racy, for example, is defined on a working basis by invoking R.A. 
Dahl's7 institutional guarantees for democracy and elaborating them. 
The rule of law is defined by recourse to Elster's distinction between 
6. See FEDERALIZM: TEORIIA, INSTITUTY, OTNOSHENIIA (SRAVNITEL'NO-PRAVOVOE 
ISSLEDOVANIE) (FEDERALISM. THEORY, INSTITUTES, RELATIONS (COMPARATIVE LAW 
STUDY)] 11-44 (B. N. Topomin ed., 2001). 
7. R. A. DAHL, POLY ARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1971). 
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the rule of law and the principle of legality.8 They both serve Kahn 
well in his approach, and he intelligently and persuasively extends 
their application to Russia insofar as they may be applicable. 
Yet here, too, is an excessive "Americanization" of the conceptual 
apparatus. Elster's proposition that the rule of law means the "pro­
spective principles that laws be stable and predictable" (p. 25 n.23) ob­
scures one of the most fascinating and meaningful debates in Russian 
legal thought, a debate whose outcome is far from assured. Elster 
would not, nor would nearly all Anglo-American political scientists or 
jurists, think to distinguish between the concepts of law routinely ex­
pressed in European tongues but not in the English language: the dis­
tinction between jus and lex (Latin), droit and Loi (French), recht and 
gesetz (German) and pravo and zakon (Russian). The core of the de­
bate in Russian jurisprudence at the moment with regard to the rule of 
law is, "which law?": pravo or zakon? Adherence to zakon, or lex -
that is, man-made statutory law - is normally a principle recognized 
in authoritarian and democratic states alike. Andrei Vyshinskii, the 
lead prosecutor in the Stalinist show trials, called in the mid-1930s for 
a return to "stability of laws" (stabil'nost' zakonov ), a perfectly re­
spectable principle of positivism. President Putin's much debated plea 
for the dictatorship of a law (diktatura zakona) may be understood in 
the same way, or may be construed as a reference to legality, that is, 
compliance with legislation. Depending upon context it is merely a 
plea to be more law-abiding, for a reduction of criminality, for compli­
ance within a federated system of federal law on the part of the sub­
jects of the Russian Federation, and so on. 
Many Russian jurists equate jus and lex, pravo and zakon. The last 
is a mirror image of the first. Others insist upon their being distin­
guished: pravo is the totality of law, not merely man-made legislation, 
and zakon must conform to pravo or be deemed illegal. For propo­
nents of pravo a key issue is its source - divine law, customary law, 
natural law, or others. It will be obvious that the human rights clauses 
of the 1993 Russian Constitution have an origin in something other 
than zakon; they must have, if those rights are to be considered inal­
ienable, as the Constitution provides.9 
Kahn is well aware of the issue, though (pp. 53-56), and he distin­
guishes between "Law" and "law" to make his point effectively in 
English. Whether AV. Dicey should be read to support a linkage be­
tween the rule of law and federalism, l have some doubts. Dicey be­
lieved that federalism meant "legalism - the predominance of the ju­
diciary in the constitution - the prevalence of a spirit of legality 
among the people" (pp. 54-55). This, coming from a jurist whose coun-
8. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (J. Elster & R. Slagstad eds., 1988). 
9. See BUTLER, supra note 2, at 84. 
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try did not and does not have a constitution, may be read as the views 
of a proponent of "lex" as much as "jus." Kahn, however, believes 
Dicey has in mind Law, not law; that is, Dicey's "legalism" means 
Law, whose core qualities are: "legitimacy, predictability, stability, 
fairness, efficiency, and a repudiation of secrecy in promulgating laws 
and regulations" (p. 55). Those are core qualities that President Putin 
would associate with his expression "dictatorship of law" as a positiv­
ist. Whether they are pravo, and whether Dicey in positivist England 
saw them as Law, is open to doubt. 
Around that issue turns the compatibility of federalism with both 
democracy and authoritarianism. Since I understand federalism to be 
a more centralized scheme, legally, formally, and actually than federa­
tionism, which is a looser relationship that invokes statehood and sov­
ereignty to a greater degree than would be the case in a federal sys­
tem, the rule of jus is more essential if a federation is to be truly 
democratic and respect the elements of autonomy granted to subjects 
of the Federation. 
If, however, it were to be accepted that federalism cannot truly ex­
ist without democracy and the rule of law, one must ask why there are 
so few federated states in the world .. Here is where the implications of 
"federal theory" become obscure. If Kahn is correct, is it the view that 
the antithesis also is true: democracy and the rule of Law are inherent 
attributes of true federalism, but without federalism democracy and 
the rule of Law cannot exist? Surely world experience is otherwise. 
Kahn observes that "federalism appeals to states struggling with vari­
ous forms of internal disharmony, but which nonetheless value diver­
sity within a more unitary framework . . . .  There is seldom a single 
motivation; a variety of factors often intermingle and co-determine the 
prospects for federalism" (p. 61). That would seem to be as prescient 
an observation as possible. 
From "federal theory," or what I would prefer to call "theories of 
federationism," the book moves on to a thorough and fascinating con­
sideration of the legacy of Soviet "federalism," Gorbachev's "federal­
ism problem," the process of federal transition, inter-governmental 
relations under Yeltsin's new federalism, federal effects on transitions 
in Russia's republics, and the federal reforms of President Putin. 
These require six chapters in all, and I have not seen a better account, 
or a more perceptive one, in any language. One may disagree with ob­
servations in passing, or the emphasis placed, but overall the account 
is assured and full of insights.10 Indeed, here is where the book comes 
into its own, for the author has conducted extensive interviews with 
the architects of federationism at all levels in Russia, explored the na­
tional and regional press and national, regional, and local legislation, 
10. One useful account which eluded the author is z. Douglas, Constitutional Founda­
tions of Russian Federalism, IV SUDEBNIK 823-68 (1999). 
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judicial practice, and the Western literature on federalism ---, all scru­
pulously recorded in an excellent bibliography. 
And here too is where, to borrow one of Kahn's favorite terms, an 
"asymmetry" exists. One of the many strengths of the study is Kahn's 
account and assessment ofWestern federalism theories and Soviet and 
Russian practice. Missing is an examination of post-Soviet Russian 
doctrines on federalism. The literature is considerable, because the 
debate has been active, continuous, and interdisciplinary. To venture a 
purely impressionistic judgment, the Russian literature on federation­
ism has become more interesting and perceptive than its foreign coun­
terpart simply because Russian federationism is still in the making and 
Russian scholars have either a ringside seat or a participatory role.11 
Perhaps the disposition of social scientists and lawyers to "classify" 
causes us to overlook the wheat for the chaff. The Russian Federation 
did indeed inherit a Soviet-structured species of federation, and the 
early debate naturally resounded on how much of that structure to re­
tain and what changes should be introduced. Concepts such as "sover­
eignty," "statehood," "nationhood" - associated more with public in­
ternational law and independent statehood than with constitutional 
law and federationism - were bandied about, as Kahn demonstrates, 
in the most remarkable and inconsistent ways by individuals who had 
little appreciation, perhaps, of their full implications. But that is pre­
cisely the point. This has been quite properly a Russian dialogue, and 
the formal trappings of federationism as measured by continuity in the 
stature of territorial-administrative entities, boundaries, state struc­
tures, and the like remain greatly indebted to the Soviet era. Alloca­
tions of jurisdiction have, of course, redounded to the side of the sub­
jects of the Federation. Although the central government seems 
determined to claw back some of what was conceded, and at the mo­
ment is succeeding, this will always be in Russia a sphere of shifting 
gravities as part of the political process. And so it should be. 
Parts of the story might have received greater attention from Kahn 
in their legal dimension. The treaties between the central government 
and the subjects of the Federation, more than 800, are a story far from 
fully told, yet they seem in a difficult transition era to have played a 
constructive lubricant role in enabling central-periphery relations to 
achieve a proper balance. Their uncertain legal status may have intro­
duced elements of flexibility during an era when lines drawn sharply in 
the sand could have provoked more serious conflicts than they did. A 
particularly attractive feature of the book are the occasional excur-
11. See, e.g., FEDERALIZM I REGIONAL'NAIA POLmKA v POLIETNICHNYKH 
GOSUDARSTVAKH [FEDERALISM AND REGIONAL POLICY IN POLY-ETHNIC STATES) (R.N. 
lsmagilova & V.R. Filippov eds., 2001); 0SNOVY NATSIONAL'NYKH I FEDERATIVNYKH 
OTNOSHENII [FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALITY AND FEDERATIVE RELATIONS) (R. G. Ab­
dulatipov ed., 2001). 
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suses into individual case studies - Bashkortostan, Kalmykia, and 
others - to examine individual leadership, election, or other issues. 
Comparative tables inform the reader, although sometimes they suffer 
from unsatisfactory translations of legal texts.12 
In his Conclusion, Kahn quotes William Riker to the effect that 
"an initial difficulty in any discussion of federalism is that the meaning 
of the word has been thoroughly confused by dramatic changes in the 
institutions to which it refers" (p. 279). Riker is quite wrong. It is not 
the meaning of the word that has been confused; it is the inadequacy 
of the terminology generally to keep apace of and satisfactorily to de­
scribe the multiple variants of federationism. Small wonder that politi­
cal elites in Russia confront conflicting conceptions of what exactly it 
means to be federal. It is not for the Russians to fit themselves into 
any preexisting procrustean bed of federalism; it is for them to fashion 
their own destiny within a species of federationism that they find con­
genial and suitable to their circumstances. Other conceptions of fed­
erationism may inform some of their choices, as will their own history. 
Whether Russia meets or will meet some ideal type of federationism is 
irrelevant; more important is whether she conforms to democratic and 
rule-of-pravo values and standards consistent with her own standards 
and those of international law. 
Kahn offers sensible advice in observing that a "culture of legality" 
should be created, to which I would add a culture that is consistent 
with the rule of Law. He observes· that if the federation is to survive, 
consensus must be achieved to assert jurisdiction over individual issues 
and the level of the state that should be engaged, and that a sense of 
legal constraint must operate. Whether unilateral declarations of sov­
ereignty should give way, however, is to my mind more doubtful. They 
and the political philosophy underlying them are the safety valve of 
form should the Russian Federation at some point veer backward to­
ward the Soviet substance of federalism. Here the ground is more un­
certain, for many political communities in the Russian Federation are 
manifestly not sovereign and will not be recognized as such in the 
world as we know it. The Russian Federation is not a treaty-based 
federation in the sense that the USSR was, and the treaties of the fed­
eration are not widely accepted, if at all, as documents of international 
law either by most of the parties thereto or by the international com­
munity. But the Russian Federation is officially named a federation 
(which the USSR never was), and during the Soviet era it was named a 
"federated" or "federative" republic. 
In reading Kahn's account of especially the past decade, one is 
struck by how rapidly everything has proceeded within the context of 
federationism - from a state which played the lead role in disman-
12. In Table 6.5, the passage from the 1994 Udmurtia Constitution is legally unintelligi­
ble, and many of the others contain internal inconsistencies or infelicities. 
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tling another state, to a fragile political climate in which burgeoning 
sovereignties could have led to self-destruction of the country, to a 
melange of schemes for "papering over the cracks," to a considerable 
tug-of-war between the center and the periphery that initially, in the 
form of treaties, went very far in favor of the periphery, to the present 
era in which the center is, through a combination of presidential and 
judicial authority, taking back some of what was conceded previ-
ously.13 
· · 
The saga is not over; it has barely commenced. Kahn's study is the 
best and most thoughtful account available of the early experience. 
13. A senior member of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation 
involved in renegotiating the basic treaties between the Federal Government and the sub­
jects of the Russian Federation observed, in an interview with the present writer in July 
2002, that the Russian Government intends to dissolve all these treaties by agreement with 
the subject of the Russian Federation concerned. Thirty-two treaties have been terminated 
by consent during the past year and another ten are in the process of either termination or 
renegotiation. In the view of the Federal Government, these treaties create unacceptable 
exceptions to the 1993 Russian Constitution and an unequal legal regime amongst the sub­
jects of the Russian Federation. Some treaties may come to be replaced by "agreements" 
which implement particular federal policies or programs in the regions without establishing 
unconstitutional privileges or concessions for individual regions. 
